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DISCOVERY OF PENALTIES 
W. Hamilton Bryson* 
It is a well-established and fundamental principle of justice that 
no one may be compelled to subject himself to punishments nor to 
give evidence leading to that result. Nemo tenetur prodere seip-
sum 1 is an ancient maxim. It was written directly into the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights in 1776, which states that in all "criminal 
prosecutions" no one can "be compelled to give evidence against 
himself."2 This idea was also incorporated into the United States 
Constitution in 1791 through the fifth amendment.3 
The purpose of this essay is to discuss some aspects of the scope 
of the privilege against self-incrimination. It will consider first 
what can not be and then what can be discovered by the common 
law of England before 1776, when the first republican constitution 
of Virginia was promulgated." Finally, the developments in Vir-
ginia and federal practice will be dealt with. 
Not only is the privilege against self-incrimination applicable in 
• Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., Hampden-Sydney College, 1963; 
LL.B., Harvard University, 1967; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1968; Ph.D., Cambridge 
University, 1972. The author would like to acknowledge the generous fellowship of the 
American Council of Learned Societies which supported this research. 
1. E.g., Young v. Scott, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 415, 416 (1826); United States v. McRae, L.R. 4 
Eq. 327, 337 (1867); Harrison v. Southcote, 1 Atk. 528, 534, 26 Eng. Rep. 333 (Ch. 1751); 
Protector v. Lord Lumley, Hardr. 22, 145 Eng. Rep. 360 (Ex. 1655); Burrowes v. High Com-
mission, 3 Buist. 48, 50, 81 Eng. Rep. 42 (K.B. 1615). The maxim is sometimes expressed as 
Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare; e.g., Rex v. Purnell, 1 Wm. Black. 37, 39, 96 Eng. Rep. 20 
(K.B. 1748); E. WINGATE, MAXIMES 486 (1658). See generally 1 E. R. DANIELL, CHANCERY 
PRACTICE 605-610 (8th ed. 1914); J. STORY, EQuiTY PLEADING §§ 521-25, 553, 575-98 (1838). 
2. Art. 8, 1 W. W. HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 48 (1809); 9 id. 110. VA. 
CoNsT. art. 1, § 8. Note also R. L. PERRY & J. C. CooPER, SouRCES OF OuR LIBERTIES 309, 
312, 422, 428, 432 (1959). 
3. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self," U.S. CoNST. amend. V; the priVilege against self-incrimination is part of the concept of 
the due process of law, and the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies it to 
the states; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
4. It is to be remembered that the common law of England is the common law of Virginia; 
VA. CoDE ANN. § 1-10 (Repl. Vol. 1979); see also W. H. BRYSON, NOTEs ON VIRGINIA CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 9-10 (1979). 
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criminal prosecutions, cs but also it applies in civil litigation. A per-
son, whether a witness in or a party to a civil proceeding, cannot be 
compelled to give information or to produce documents which will 
incriminate him in a separate, independent criminal trial. It has 
been further held that information is privileged even if it might 
only tend to incriminate6 or if it might provide any link in the 
chain of proof in a criminal prosecution.7 
Witnesses in both common law and equity cases are included in 
this privilege. Parties to lawsuits were not competent to testify as 
witnesses until the nineteenth century,8 and thus they could not 
give testimony for or against themselves. However, in the courts of 
equity, although parties were incompetent as witnesses, they could 
be compelled to discover evidence as a part of the process of plead-
ing. This was done by means of interrogatories, which were in-
cluded in bills of discovery and in normal bills for relief.9 Indeed, it 
has been said that every bill (and cross bill) requires discovery.10 
This is so because the other party has a general obligation in eq-
uity practice to respond under oath to all of the material allega-
tions of the bill filed against him.11 This sworn answer can then be 
used as an admission or as evidence in equity or in a related pro-
ceeding at common law. 
A bill in equity which seeks an answer or discovery, directly or 
indirectly, of matters involving self-incrimination is improper as a 
matter of law. The most elegant way of asserting one's privilege 
against self-incrimination is by demurrer, since this is a defect in 
law.12 If sufficient facts do not appear in the bill, the defendant 
5. E.g., Rex v. Heydon, 1 Wm. Black. 351,96 Eng. Rep. 195 (K.B. 1762); Rex v. Cornelius, 
2 Stra. 1210, 93 Eng. Rep. 1133 (K.B. 1744); Regina v. Mead, 2 Ld. Raym. 927,92 Eng. Rep. 
119 (K.B. 1703); Rex v. Worsenham, 1 Ld. Raym. 705, 91 Eng. Rep. 1370 (K.B. 1701). 
6. E.g., Harrison v. Southcote, 1 Atk. 528, 539, 26 Eng. Rep. 333, 2 Ves. Sen. 389, 28 Eng. 
Rep. 249 (Ch. 1751); East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sen. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 
1749). 
7. E.g., Paxton v. Douglas, 19 Ves. Jun. 225, 227, 34 Eng. Rep. 502 (Ch. 1812); Claridge v. 
Hoare, 14 Ves. Jun. 59, 33 Eng. Rep. 443 (Ch. 1807). 
8. 1866-67 Va. Acts, c. 170, p. 615; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-396 (Repl. Vol. 1977). 
9. W. H. BRYSON, DISCOVERY IN VmGINIA 5-11 (1978). 
10. E.g., Baker v. Morris, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 284, 311-12 (1839); J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADING 
§ 311 (1838). 
11. J. STORY, EQuiTY PLEADING §§ 847, 852-54, 874 (1838); W. H. BRYSON, NOTES oN Vm-
GINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 94-96 (1979). 
12. J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADING §§ 521-24, 547, 553, 575-94 (1838). 
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must allege them by means of a plea.13 The strength of the privi-
lege is such, however, that it may be put forth in an answer1" or 
simply by not responding, 15 but this is considered sloppy pleading. 
By these means, the scope of the privilege came to be defined and 
refined by the courts of equity, although the idea of self-incrimina-
tion is not limited to matters of equity or "conscience." In 1737 
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said that "there is no rule more estab-
lished in equity, than that a person shall not be obliged to discover 
what will subject him to a penalty, or anything in the nature of a 
penalty"~8; this rule is the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Since all suits in equity involve discovery, there can be no litiga-
tion in the courts of equity founded on penal statutes.17 
The basic concept here is that of the burden of proof. According 
to the ancient common law theory, the prosecution must prove a 
defendant's guilt, if it can. It is not for the defendant to be forced 
to prove his own guilt.18 The courts of equity may require a defen-
dant to discover or produce evidence of his own civil wrongdoings, 
but this would result in his paying just compensation, not in a pen-
alty, nor in his suffering corporal punishment. One of,the major 
problems with the old court of star chamber was that it used eq-
uity procedures in the prosecution of crimes and thus forced defen-
dants to discover or admit their own guilt. This fault in that court 
was perceived after it was abolished, 19 and the surviving courts of 
equity shunned this very bad example. 
There can be no discovery of a crime which might subject a per-
son to sanctions or punishments; the crime, an offense against the 
public good, might be a matter of the common law or a statute. 
Some of the crimes of which discovery was not allowed by the ear-
13. E.g., Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sen. 243, 245, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1751); a 
plea is strictly construed, see e.g., Gascoyne v. Sidwell, Gilb. Rep. 186, 25 Eng. Rep. 131, 2 
Eq. Cas. Abr. 72 (pl. 19), 171 (pl. 1), 22 Eng. Rep. 63, 146 (Ch. 1726). 
14. E.g., Earl of Suffolk v. Green, 1 Atk. 450, 26 Eng. Rep. 286 (Ch. 1739). 
15. E.g., Wrottesley v. Bendish, 3 P. Wms. 235, 24 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1733). 
16. Smith v. Read, 1 Atk. 526, 527, 26 Eng. Rep. 332, West t. Hard. 16, 17, 25 Eng. Rep. 
796 (Ch. 1737). 
17. Anon., 3 Leon. 204, 74 Eng. Rep. 634 (Ex. 1588). 
18. E.g., Firebrass's Case, 2 Salk. 550, 91 Eng. Rep. 465 (Dutchy Cham. 1700); Dighton 
and Holt's Case, Cro. Jac. 388, 79 Eng. Rep. 332 (K.B. 1616). 
19. Argument of counsel in Attorney General v. Mico, Hardr. 137, 141, 145 Eng. Rep. 419 
(EL 1658). 
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lier cases were murder,20 piracy and larceny,21 ravishment of ward 
(kidnapping),22 bribery,28 forgery,2" incest,25 simony,28 covin and 
fraud,27 subornation of perjury,28 unmarried cohabitation and 
criminal conspiracy,29 maintenance,30 theftboot (receiving stolen 
property),31 improperly invoking the jurisdiction of the court of 
admiralty,32 trading against the prohibitions of a statute and ex-
porting contraband silver,33 trading contrary to the monopoly of a 
company,34 holding simultaneously a public office and a seat in 
Parliament,35 holding simultaneously two ecclesiastical livings,38 
and being an agent of the Confederate States of America. 37 
It is to be remembered that in the eighteenth century and ear-
lier, many statutes encouraged criminal prosecutions by informers, 
private persons, who were given a part of the fine or forfeiture as a 
reward for their public services. This was necessary for the reason-
20. E.g., Procter v. Darnbrook, Hob. 138, 80 Eng. Rep. 288 (Star Cham. 1617). 
21. E.g., East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sen. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749). 
22. E.g., Vice-Countess Montague v. Anon., Cary 9, 21 Eng. Rep. 5 (Ch. n.d.). 
23. E.g., Rex v. Heydon, 1 Wm. Black. 351, 96 Eng. Rep. 195 (K.B. 1762); Rex v. Corne-
lius, 2 Stra. 1210, 93 Eng. Rep. 1133 (K.B. 1744). 
24. E.g., Rex v. Worsenham, 1 Ld. Raym. 705, 91 Eng. Rep. 1370 (K.B. 1701). 
25. E.g., Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sen. 243, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1751)(marriage 
with deceased wife's sister). 
26. E.g., Attorney General ex rel. Hindley v. Sudell, Prec. Ch. 214, 24 Eng. Rep. 105 (Ch. 
1702). 
27. E.g., Spendlow v. Smith, Hob. 84, 80 Eng. Rep. 234 (temp. James 1). 
28. E.g., Baker v. Pritchard, 2 Atk. 387, 26 Eng. Rep. 634 (Ch. 1742). 
29. E.g., Chetwynd v. Lindon, 2 Ves. Sen. 450, 28 Eng. Rep. 288 (Ch. 1752). 
30. E.g., Sharp v. Carter, 3 P. Wms. 375, 24 Eng. Rep. 1108 (Ch. 1735); Cook v. Arnold, 79 
SELDEN Soc'v 461 (case 599)(Ch. 1676); Ex'rs. of Penrice v. Barker, 73 SELDEN Soc'v 63 (case 
110), Repts. temp. Finch 75, 23 Eng. Rep. 40 (Ch. 1674); stat. 32 Hen. 8 (1540), c. 9, 3 
STATUTES OF THE REALM 753. 
31. E.g., Micklethwayt v. Merrett, 79 SELDEN Soc'v 876 (case 1097)(Ch. 1681). 
32. E.g., Pensax v. Litten, 73 SELDEN Soc'v 23 (case 46)(Ch. 1674); stat. 2 Hen. 4 (1401), c. 
11, 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 124. 
33. E.g., Duncalfv. Blake, 1 Atk. 52,26 Eng. Rep. 35 (Ch. 1737); Harrison v. Houblon, 79 
SELDEN Soc'v 818 (case 1024)(Ch. 1680); stat. 10 Will. 3 (1698), c. 16, 7 STATUTES OF THE 
REALM 524 (wool exports from Ireland). 
34. E.g., Fisher v. Michel, 73 SELDEN Soc'v 245 (case 362)(Ch. 1675). 
35. E.g., Selwyn v. Honeywood, 9 Mod. 419, 88 Eng. Rep. 546, 2 Atk. 276, 26 Eng. Rep. 
961 (Ch. 1744); stat. 12 & 13 Will. 3 (1701), c. 10, §§ 88, 89, 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 711. 
36. E.g., Boteler v. Allington, 3 Atk. 453, 26 Eng. Rep. 1061 (Ch. 1746); stat. 21 Hen. 8 
(1529), c. 13, § 9, 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 293. 
37. United States v. McRae, L.R. 4 Eq. 327 (1867), aff'd. L.R. 3 Ch. 79 (1867); U.S. Act of 
July 17, 1862, §§ 5-8. 
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able enforcement of revenue and regulatory statutes because there 
was no police force or governmental agency whose duties were pri-
marily directed to this end. The various departments of the state 
were not designed to enforce penal statutes. Private prosecutions 
were conducted in the common law courts in the name of the at-
torney general or the king ex relatione the informer or else i~ the 
name of the informer qui tam, who was suing on behalf Qf the 
crown as well as himself. Although these prosecutions were in the 
hands of common informers rather than public officials, they were 
still criminal in nature and in effect, and the privilege against self-
incrimination was available. 
Not only can one not get discovery of criminal penalties, but also 
there can be no discovery of civil penalties. The distinction be-
tween civil penalties and civil damages is to be noted. The differ-
ence is that between the punishment of the wrongdoer and the 
compensation to the victim of a wrong. The most frequent exam-
ples of civil penalties in English law were treble damages for com-
mitting waste38 and for failing to pay tithes39 and the forfeiture of 
a loan for which a usurious rate of interest had been charged.40 In 
these cases a private person, not the crown, received the penalty. 
Discovery was normally needed by a plaintiff to have an ac-
counting of the extent of the damages in the above-mentioned 
causes of action. Since the plaintiff must come into equity for an 
accounting in order to be able to make out a prima facie case at 
law (or in equity, if he chose to sue for the damages there), the 
equity court would require him to waive the penalty and sue for 
single damages, compensation, only.41 Thus he would have the dis-
38. E.g., Attorney General ex rel. Waters v. Vincent, Bunb. 192, 145 Eng. Rep. 644 (Ex. 
1724); Firebrass's Case, 2 Salk. 550, 91 Eng. Rep. 465 (Dutchy Cham. 1700); Statute of 
Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 5, 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 48. 
39. E.g., Wools v. Walley, 1 Anstr. 100, 145 Eng. Rep. 812 (Ex. 1792); in Anon., 1 Vern. 
60, 23 Eng. Rep. 310 (Ch. 1682), it was ruled that only a vicar, not his executor, could sue 
for the penalty; Anon., 3 Leon. 204, 74 Eng. Rep. 634 (Ex. 1588). Driver v. Man, Hardr. 190, 
145 Eng. Rep. 446 (EL 1661), required discovery, but it was criticized by the reporter as 
being contrary to the normal practice. Act for the Payment of Tithes, 1548, 2 & 3 Edw. VI, 
c. 13, § 1, 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM 56. 
40. E.g., Earl of Suffolk v. Green, 1 Atk. 450, 26 Eng. Rep. 286 (Ch. 1739); Act Against 
Usury, 1571, 13 Eliz. I, c. 8, §§ 2, 4, 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM 542; Fenton v. Blomer, Public 
Record Office MS. C.33/61, f. 66 (Ch. 1580). 
41. See, e.g., Regina v. Newel, Parker 269, 145 Eng. Rep. 777 (Ex. 1707); Cary and Cot-
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covery he needed without violating the defendant's privilege 
against self-incrimination. If there were no waiver, the defendant 
would not be required to answer nor to suffer any penalty as a 
result of any discovery. 
A forfeiture is not just compensation for a wrong done; therefore, 
the occurrence of a condition subsequent is not discoverable. No 
discovery of a widow's remarriage was required where this would 
involve the forfeiture of a gift or bequest.42 Likewise no discovery 
of the lack of consent to a marriage was enforced, if this was a 
condition subsequent to a forfeiture.43 Also there would be no dis-
covery which would result in the forfeiture of a leasehold or other 
property interest.44 On the other hand, alienage, which limited the 
right to own land, was held to be only an "incapacity" and thus 
discoverable. 411 
If the penalty or forfeiture were waived, then discovery was 
freely available in order to determine the defendant's liability and 
the plaintiff's damages.48 The practice of waiving the penalties be-
came standard in suits for tithes,47 and the courts eventually held 
that in tithes cases a prayer for single damages constituted an im-
plied waiver of the statutory treble damages:118 If the criminal of-
fense had been pardoned so that there was no longer any danger of 
a penalty, then the crime was discoverable. Also where there had 
tington v. Mildmay, Toth. 7, 21 Eng. Rep. 107 (Ch. 1590);. 
42. E.g., Monnins v. Monnins, 2 Ch. Rep. 68, 21 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1673); contra Lucas v. 
Evans, 3 Atk. 260, 26 Eng. Rep. 951 (Ch. 1745)(the forfeiture was said to be only a "condi-
tional limitation over"). 
43. E.g., Chancey v. Fenhoulet, 2 Ves. Sen. 265, 28 Eng. Rep. 171 (Ch. 1751)(semble); 
Chauncey v. Tahourden, 2 Atk. 392, 26 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ch. 1742); Wrottesley v. Bendish, 3 
P. Wms. 235,24 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1733); Wynn v. Wynn, 73 SELDEN Soc'y 382 (Ch. 1676). 
44. E.g., Lord Uxbridge v. Staveland, 1 Ves. Sen. 56, 27 Eng. Rep. 888 (Ch. 1747); see also 
Rosser v. Evans, 1 Freeman 313, 22 Eng. Rep. 1234, 73 SELDEN Soc'y 221 (Ch. 1675); Fane v. 
Atlee, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 77, 21 Eng. Rep. 890 (Ch. 1700); Price v. Evans, 73 SELDEN Soc'Y 334 
(Ch. 1676); Deacon v. Lucas, 73 SELDEN Soc'y 331 (Ch. 1676); Churchill v. Isaack, 73 SELDEN 
Soc'v 12 (Ch. 1673). 
45. E.g., Attorney-General v. Duplessis, Parker 144, 145 Eng. Rep. 739 (Ex. 1752), atf'd, 1 
Brown Pari. Cas. 415, 1 Eng. Rep. 658 (H.L. 1753). 
46. E.g., Attorney-General v. Cresner, Parker 279, 145 Eng. Rep. 779 (Ex. 1710)(dictum); 
Attorney-General v. Cursell, Brit. Lib. MS. Hargr. 70, p. 102, pl. 336 (Ex. 1696); Attorney-
General v. Anonymous, Hardr. 201, 145 Eng. Rep. 452 (Ex. 1661)(semble). 
47. 3 R. BuRN, EccLESIASTICAL LAw 763 (9th ed. 1842). 
48. E.g., Wools v. Walley, 1 Anstr. 100, 145 Eng. Rep. 812 (Ex. 1792); Attorney-General e:r 
rel. Waters v. Vincent, Bunb. 192, 145 Eng. Rep. 644 (Ex. 1724)(dictum). 
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been a trial already, the doctrine of double jeopardy would protect 
against any further penalty similarly to a pardon. The essence of 
the privilege is to protect against a penalty, not a mere conviction 
of a crime nor the shame of criminality exposed. The statute of 
limitations may protect against a forfeiture also. 
A person may by contract agree to make discovery of matters 
which may expose him to penalties,"9 and he may contract to pay 
penalties and forfeitures. In this latter case, the payments are not 
penalties in the legal sense but only terms of the contract, and the 
courts will enforce such payments and will force the discovery that 
is necessary to prove them.150 
In Virginia, as in England, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion can be asserted in any court. "[N]o man should anywhere, 
before any tribunal, in any proceeding, be compelled to give evi-
dence tending to criminate himself, either in that or any other pro-
ceeding."151 As one Virginia court reasoned, 
It is not the province of equity to do more than justice between par-
ties litigant before it, and it leaves whatever savours of punishment 
or penal retribution to the rigours of the common law. It therefore 
not only refuses directly to enforce penalties and forfeitures, but will 
not for such a purpose exercise its ancillary jurisdiction in aid of a 
common law forum, and especially when it is called upon to compel 
a discovery on oath from the party sought to be subjected. In the 
last respect, indeed, it conforms to the spirit of the common law, 
which, jealous of the liberty of the citizen, protects him from being 
made his own accuser, or forced to give evidence against himself.'12 
No person is required to disclose anything which will or might 
"expose him to pains, penalties, or punishment, or to a criminal 
prosecution therefor."153 The privilege includes not only criminal or 
49. E.g., South Sea Co. v. Bumpstead, Mosely 74,25 Eng. Rep. 279 {Ch. 1728); East India 
Co. v. Atkins, 1 Stra. 168, 93 Eng. Rep. 452, 1 Comyns 347, 92 Eng. Rep. 1105 {Ch. 1719). 
50. E.g., African Co. v. Parish, 2 Vern. 244, 23 Eng. Rep. 758 {Ch. 1691); East India Co. v. 
Maniston, 73 SELDEN Soc'y 384, 2 Chan. Cas. 218, 22 Eng. Rep. 918 {Ch. 1676). 
51. Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. {24 Gratt.) 624, 628 {1873){Cullen refused to testify 
before a grand jury about a duel). 
52. Poindexter v. Davis, 47 Va. {6 Gratt.) 481, 490 {1850){no discovery leading to the 
forfeiture of property). 
53. Northwestern Bank v. Nelson, 42 Va. {1 Gratt.) 108, 126 {1844){receiving stolen 
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penal matters, but also the 
discovery of waste committed by a tenant, unless the consequential 
penalty or forfeiture be waived, or of any matter which would sub-
ject the party to the loss of a franchise or office, or of a breach of 
commercial regulations exposing him to the forfeiture of a ship or 
cargo; and so, on the other hand, it reaches the case of the assign-
ment of a lease by a lessee without license, or of a marriage without 
consent of a parent or other person designated, by which .there is to 
be a forfeiture of a term, estate, portion or jointure.114 
Thus parties have been protected from discovery involving the 
crimes of perpetrating a fraud,C515 of being an accessory to a duel, 156 
and of receiving stolen property.157 One was not compelled to an-
swer whether he had taken property out of the state where this 
would result in its forfeiture to a reversioner or remainderman.158 
Although the Virginia usury statutes normally did not require any 
penalties, in those cases where they might, there could be no dis-
covery of illegal interest.159 On the other hand, one can force the 
discovery of the lack of good faith on the part of a purchaser60 and 
the fact of an illegal consideration for a contract,61 since neither 
leads to a penalty or civil forfeiture. 
The privilege is pleaded in equity by demurrer, if the danger of 
the penalty or forfeiture appears from the plaintiff's bill. If it does 
not, the protection may be claimed by plea or by answer.62 
property). 
54. Poindexter v. Davis, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 481, 491 (1850). 
55. E.g., Dulaney v. Smith, 97 Va. 130, 33 S.E. 533 (1899). 
56. E.g., Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 624 (1873). 
57. E.g., Northwestern Bank v. Nelson, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 108 (1844). 
58. E.g., Poindexter v. Davis, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 481 (1850). This forfeiture was threatened 
by 1 VA. REv. CoDE, c. 111, § 48, p. 431 (1819). 
59. E.g., Belton v. Apperson, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 207, 214 (1875); Hogshead v. Baylor, 57 
Va. (16 Gratt.) 99, 105, 106 (1860); Young v. Scott, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 415, 416, 419, 420 
(1826)(citing Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sen. 243, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1751)); Mc-
Pherrin v. King, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 172, 182-184 (1822). The Virginia statutes were milder on 
usurers than the English ones; see VA. CoDE, c. 141, §§ 7, 10 (1860), and VA. CoDE, c. 141, 
§ 11 (1849). Cf. Walters v. Creger, 4 Q. L. J. 76, 77 (Cir. Ct. Wythe Co. 1858). 
60. E.g., Love v. Braxton, Wythe 144 (Va. 1792). 
61. E.g., White v. Washington, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 645, 651 (1848)(a gambling debt). 
62. E.g., Northwestern Bank v. Nelson, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 108, 126 (1844). 
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In federal practice, the privilege against self-incrimination "can 
be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative 
or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory."83 This is an eloquent re-
statement of the traditional rule, but it is to be remembered that 
the interpretation of this privilege by the United States Supreme 
Court is controlling in that this rule is a part of the due process of 
law required to be followed in state courts according to the four-
teenth amendment.tu 
No one may be required to discover matters which might lead to 
his conviction of a crime.815 Penalties and forfeitures may be civil in 
form but criminal in nature, and because of their penal aspects, 
they cannot be enforced by requiring a person to testify against 
himself. 88 Furthermore, the scope of this protection extends be-
yond strictly criminal punishments to civil forfeiture proceedings 
under the internal revenue laws87 and under state banking laws,88 
to the forfeiture of contraband liquor,89 to civil actions to recover 
statutory penalties,70 and to suits for treble damages under the 
Emergency Price Control Act.71 
The privilege against self-incrimination cannot be invoked where 
there is no danger of prosecution or forfeiture, where, for example, 
the statute of limitations has expired, where the offense has been 
pardoned, or immunity has been granted.72 This privilege is, more-
63. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964)(White, J., concurring), 
quoted in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 464 (1975). 
64. U.S. CoNST. Amends. V and XIV; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
65. E.g., In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974)(antitrust and criminal 
conspiracy); Porter v. Heend, 6 F.R.D. 588 (N.D. ill. 1947). 
66. E.g., Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 631-634 (1886). 
67. E.g., United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1970). 
68. E.g., United States v. Saline Bank of Va., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100, 104 (1828). 
69. E.g., Castro v. United States, 23 F.2d 263, 266 (1st Cir. 1927). 
70. E.g., United States v. Fishman, 15 F.R.D. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Note that the majority 
and concurring opinions in United States v. Ward, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980), held that pay-
ments denoted by Congress as "civil penalt[ies]" in 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(6) were in fact only 
civil compensatory damages, which were remedial and not penal, and were thus 
discoverable. 
71. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 901 (1951); E.g., Bowles v. 
Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Cal. 1945). 
72. E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66-67 (1905). In our federal system of government, 
the question of immunity from prosecution is a particularly vexing one; see e.g., Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
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over, personal to the witness, and he cannot invoke it on behalf of 
another, his principal, or his employer.73 Thus one can be com-
pelled to testify against and to incriminate one's friends and em-
ployers. Since corporations must perform all acts through agents, it 
is difficult for them to keep secrets; corporations are vulnerable to 
full discovery by means of compulsion applied to their agents. 
In summary it is to be noted that criminal punishments and civil 
penalties and forfeitures, as a matter of the law of evidepce, must 
be proved by the plaintiffs; defendants cannot be made to provide 
proof against themselves. In civil litigation, the distinction made is 
that between punishment of the defendant and compensation for 
the plaintiff's losses. Thus single damages are compensation, but 
treble damages are punishment. Treble damages result in an 
unearned profit for the plaintiff. Statutes sometimes provide for 
treble damages to reward private persons for police work, but the 
courts should be wary of this and should refuse to allow their dis-
covery procedures to be used to this end, if it will result in self-
incrimination. 
At common law, punitive damages are granted against certain 
tort-feasors; and the common law courts by means of modem rules 
of discovery will require discovery leading to punitive damages for 
intentional torts. The courts of equity, on the other hand, will not, 
as a general rule, assess exemplary or punitive damages,74 and a 
party who sues in equity waives punitive damages.711 Thus, in 
equity, there is no discovery of damages which go beyond 
compensation. 
It is suggested that the modem distinctions between crime and 
tort and between criminal and civil procedures should prohibit the 
For one solution to the general problem, see P. J. Donnici, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Civil Pre-Trial Discovery: The Use of Protective Orders to Avoid Consti-
tutional Issues, 3 U.S.F. L. REv. 12 (1968). 
73. E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1905); Village of Brookfield v. Pentis, 101 
F.2d 516, 522-23 (7th Cir. 1939). 
74. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 53-54 (1980). The merger of common law and equity 
procedure has led some courts to question this rule. Id. 
75. E.g., Coca-Cola v. Dixi-Cola, 155 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1946); Superior Construction Co. v. 
Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 104 A.2d 581 (1954); Bird v. Wilmington & M. RR. Co., 8 Rich. Eq. Rep. 
46, 57, 64 Am. Dec. 739, 746 (S.C. 1855); Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare 543, 553-54, 67 Eng. 
Rep. 224, 229 (1843). 
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discovery of punitive matters in civil common law actions as well 
as in suits in equity. This was the position of the law for centuries 
before the enactment of the statutes and rules of court which allow 
discovery in common law litigation. However, discovery is now gen-
erally allowed in all civil cases; if the old rule requiring penalties to 
be waived in order to avoid self-incrimination is now enforced, pu-
nitive damages as a remedy would be destroyed. Alternatively 
there could be no discovery in such actions, which would make the 
recovery of punitive damages very difficult. 
The privilege against self-incrimination is one of the foundations 
of civil liberty. This has been recognized for centuries. It was well 
stated by Chief Justice John Marshall: "The rule clearly is, that a 
party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him 
to penalties."78 We end with the observation that the courts today, 
through the merger of law and equity and the expansion of civil 
discovery devices, enforce conflicting policies. Sometimes they will 
require discovery leading to punitive damages; sometimes they will 
protect against discovery leading to self-incrimination and civil 
penalties. 
76. United States v. Saline Bank of Va., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100, 104 (1828). 
